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Hermann Neubacher and the Austrian 
Anschluss Movement, 1918-40 
HARRY R. RITTER 
THE 
Anschluss problem was one of the most vexing legacies of 
nineteenth-century nationalism and the peace settlement of 1919. 
Seen in broad perspective, the Anschluss movement belongs to 
the final chapter in the history ofthe idea ofGrossdeutschland, a dream 
born in 1848 and shared after 1867 by German-Austrians ofthe most 
varied cultural backgrounds and political opinions. Support for Ger? 
man union intensified following the collapse ofthe Habsburg Monarchy 
in 1918, but was frustrated by the restrictions placed upon union by the 
treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain.1 After 1919 sympathy for An? 
schluss transcended party lines in the infant Austrian republic, and grew 
more rapidly than within Germany itself. For many members of the 
"front generation,,, young men who had served in the Habsburg army 
and who felt the humiliation of defeat with special intensity, the cause 
of Anschluss became a life-shaping force. Nowhere is this better illus? 
trated than in the career of Hermann Neubacher. 
Neubacher is best known as a diplomat who served the Third Reich 
in the Balkans during World War II,2 but he was also an important 
participant in interwar Austrian affairs. Energetic, resourceful, and a 
skillful public speaker, Neubacher was an ambitious provincial who 
fashioned a successful career in Vienna during the 1920s. His outstand? 
ing characteristic was the ability to cultivate and maintain connections 
with most of the groups competing for power in the first republic. 
Underlying all his actions was a resolute dedication to German unity 
which led him into activity as a political organizer and propagandist, 
and eventually drew him into the Nazi movement: following the An? 
schluss in 1938 he was appointed mayor of Vienna. The Anschluss theme 
1. Nikolaus von Preradovich, Der nationale Gedanke in Osterreich 1866-1938 (Gottingen, 
1962), pp. 17, 30. 
2. See his memoir Sonderauftrag Sudost 1940-1943: Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten, 2d 
ed. (Gottingen, 1957). 
348 
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ties together his many activities and makes his early life a study in the 
development of an "Anschluss man." 
Neubacher (1893-1960) was the son ofa school director in the Upper 
Austrian town of Gmunden. With the aid ofa government stipend he 
attended the Benedictine gymnasium in Kremsmunster and in 1912 en- 
rolled in the Hochschule fur Bodenkultur in Vienna, where he studied for- 
estry and joined a nationalist gymnastics fraternity, the Akademischer 
Turnverein. During the war he served in Italy, was cited four times for 
bravery, and earned the rank of Oberleutnant. After the war he com? 
pleted his studies, receiving the degree ofDoktor der Bodenkultur in 1920.3 
Like most Austrians, Neubacher opposed the dictated peace settle? 
ment, which honored self-determination for the former Habsburg Slavs, 
Rumanians, and ItaHans, but denied it to the Germans. He soon became 
an ardent proponent of Anschluss for Austria, a region which, he later 
wrote, "we love as a Heimat, but never wanted as a state."4 Anschluss, 
he idealistically believed, was a goal which all parties could support, a 
cause which could reconcile the ideological tensions dividing his home- 
land. Like many others, he was also convinced that the tiny republic, 
stripped of its former Danubian hinterland, simply could not survive 
economically; to endure, Austria needed to become part of a larger 
economic unit. Underlying these considerations was the conviction that 
the "greater German" idea was a product of the "logic of historical 
development," and that the union of all Germans in one state was in- 
evitable.5 These beliefs became the foundation for Neubacher's steadfast 
devotion to Anschluss in the following years. 
Although he opposed Austrian independence, Neubacher was neutral 
toward republicanism, neither attacking it nor strongly exerting himself 
in its defense. On one issue his position was clear: monarchism was a lost 
cause. Beyond this, constitutional questions were subordinate to the 
problem of union in his thinking. His attitude toward politics?based 
on the assumption that the true patriot stands above partisan quarrels? 
was widely shared in interwar Austria and probably did as much to 
undermine free institutions as more dramatic, open attacks on parlia- 
mentarianism by extremists. 
3. Private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug. 20,1972; Caroline Neu? 
bacher to the author, Vienna, Nov. 6, 1971; Die Presse (Vienna), July 3, 1960, p. 9. 
4. Der Anschluss: Mitteilungen des Osterreichisch-Deutschen Volksbundes (Vienna), Sept. 
21, 1929, p. 2. 
5. Ibid., Nov. 15, 1927, p. 1. 
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In 1920 Neubacher met two men who were to play important roles 
in Austrian politics. In that year he married the daughter of Wilhelm 
Loschnig, a minor Lower Austrian official and member ofthe Christian 
Social Party. Through his wife's family, Neubacher met the future Aus? 
trian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was a former student and close 
friend of Herr Loschnig. In the following years Dollfuss was a frequent 
guest in the Neubacher household and the two men became close 
acquaintances, although never genuine friends.6 This was due, in part, 
to differences regarding the church. Dollfuss, trained originally for 
the priesthood, championed political Catholicism, whereas Neubacher, 
while not doctrinaire, shared the anticlericalism of prewar Pan-Ger- 
manism. 
A second, more important acquaintance was Arthur Seyss-Inquart, a 
young attorney from the former Habsburg province of Moravia. By 
chance the Neubacher and Seyss-Inquart families found rooms in the 
same house in suburban Vienna soon after the war. From this, and the 
fact that both men had served as officers in Italy, a lifelong friendship 
developed between the two families. Between 1920 and 1938 the wives 
and children often spent summer holidays together. As for the men, 
their temperaments, although quite different, seemed to complement 
one another: Neubacher had an outgoing personality and was a persua- 
sive speaker and conversationalist; Seyss-Inquart was quiet, cautious, 
and reserved in his dealings with others. Both shared the conviction that 
Austria and Germany should unite.7 
Soon after the war Neubacher, Dollfuss, and Seyss-Inquart joined a 
secret nationalist fraternity called the Deutsche Gemeinschaft. The history 
of this organization is still obscure, but it is known to have included a 
number of prominent men, among them Field Marshal Karl Bardolff, 
the university professors Othmar Spann and Alfons Dopsch, and the 
archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Piffl. The goals ofthe organization, an 
ephemeral product of middle-class anti-Semitism and the "red scare" of 
the early twenties, included the cultivation of "folk consciousness," the 
conquest of Ungeradetum (a euphemism for Marxism and Jewry), and 
Anschluss. As fear of communism diminished and economic conditions 
improved, the organization declined and finally died in 1930. Both 
Seyss-Inquart and Dollfuss played leading roles in the Deutsche Gemein- 
6. Private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug. 20, 1972. 
7. Ibid.; Caroline Neubacher to the author, Vienna, Nov. 6, 1971; Wolfgang Rosar, 
Deutsche Gemeinschaft: Seyss-Inquart und der Anschluss (Vienna, 1971), p. 20. 
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schaft during the middle twenties, but Neubacher was not an active 
member. The club provided a link with fellow veterans and a place to 
discuss the problem of German unity, but Neubacher soon became skep- 
tical of achieving Anschluss via conspiratorial tactics and conceived a 
more ambitious plan: the creation ofa nonpartisan Anschluss organiza? 
tion which embraced all the major parties, including Social Democracy, 
a sworn enemy of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft.8 
Austrian Social Democracy had emerged from the war firmly com? 
mitted to the idea of union with Germany, albeit in the interests of a 
social revolution in central Europe. Unable to form an enduring na? 
tional government, its leaders nevertheless controlled until 1934 the 
municipality of Vienna, where they sponsored a model program of 
social reform and public housing. It was this program which attracted 
Neubacher to the Socialist camp in 1921, when he took a position with 
the Gemeinschaftliche Siedlungsund Baustoffanstalt (Gesiba),acorporation 
formed by the city government to finance and supply its housing project.9 
The president of Gesiba was Julius Deutsch, the man who in 1923 
would found the Socialist paramilitary force, the Republikanischer Schutz- 
hund. Under Deutsch, Neubacher rapidly won fame as an expert in pub? 
lic finance, mainly by virtue of his successful reorganization ofa number 
of unprofitable construction-materials companies which were absorbed 
by Gesiba. In 1924 he was appointed general director of Gesiba, a post 
which he held until the firm was reorganized by the Schuschnigg gov? 
ernment in 1934.10 His association with Gesiba brought Neubacher into 
a close working relationship with the leaders of Austrian Marxism and 
he cultivated friendships with some of them, including Deutsch and the 
economist Hugo Breitner. This, along with frequent visits to the Soviet 
Union in the 1920s as a commercial representative ofthe Vienna gov? 
ernment, won him the reputation ofa "fellow traveler" in some con? 
servative and nationalist circles. Actually, despite close personal and pro- 
8. Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, pp. 29-37, 47; Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Dollfuss 
(London, 1961), pp. 28-29. 
9. Osterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund in Wien, "Anschlusspolitik 1925-1938: Zei- 
tungsausschnittssammlung," 120 vols. (hereafter ZAS), vol. 118: Wiener Handelsblatt, 
Oct. 5, 1926. This collection of newspaper clippings, now in the Wiener Stadtbibliotek, 
was begun in 1925 immediately after Neubacher founded the Austro-German People's 
League (see below) and contains items from Austrian and foreign newspapers relating to 
the theme of Anschluss. In most cases page numbers are missing. 
10. Julius Deutsch, Ein Weiter Weg: Lebenserinnerungen (Vienna, 1960), pp. 157-58; 
ZAS, vol. 118: Wiener Handelsblatt, Oct. 5, 1926. 
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fessional ties with Social Democracy and a genuine commitment to 
social reform, Neubacher was not sympathetic toward Marxism; he 
was, rather, a municipal socialist in the tradition of Vienna's turn-of-the- 
century mayor, Karl Lueger, with an added interest in introducing Eb- 
enezer Howard's "garden city" idea of urban reform to Austria.11 None 
of this undermined his position in the city government, however, for he 
was recognized as a talented administrator who could help Social De? 
mocracy realize its plans for Vienna. Thus, Neubacher was able to com- 
bine middle-class nationalism and a cordial association with socialism, 
a fact of immeasurable importance for his activity as an Anschluss 
propagandist. 
In 1925 Neubacher played a leading role in the formation of two 
closely related Anschluss organizations in Vienna, the Austro-German 
Action Society (Osterreichisch-Deutscher Arbeitsgemeinschaft) and the Aus? 
tro-German People's League (Osterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund). Both 
began as offshoots ofthe Deutsch-Osterreicher Volksbund, a Berlin organi? 
zation led by Paul Lobe, the Social Democratic president ofthe German 
Reichstag. Lobe's group had originally been established in late 1918 to 
lobby for Austro-German union on the basis of national self-determina? 
tion. It never attained real numerical power, however, and did not seek 
to extend its influence to Austria until 1925, when Lobe gave his bless- 
ing to Neubacher and other Viennese organizers.12 
Ofthe two Viennese groups the Action Society was founded first, on 
May 3,1925. It was composed ofa relatively small group of concerned 
specialists (420 in 1930) who published their opinions on legal, eco? 
nomic, and cultural problems related to Anschluss in a journal called 
Deutsche Einheit. Neubacher was a founding member and, along with 
il. According to Neubacher's understanding, Marxism fostered class struggle and 
therefore contradicted the "fundamental truth" that "a nation is a special kind of organ- 
ism, indivisible, necessarily dependent on all its parts." See Archiv der Stadt Wien, H. A. 
Akten, Burgermeister, NS-Zeit (Neubacher, Blaschke 1938-1944, Aussprachen), Schach- 
tel 1-18, Mappe 35 (hereafter ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke), no. 38, Nov. 26, 1938. 
12. Osterreich-Deutschland (Berlin) 2, no. 3 (Mar. 1925): 21; Hermann Neubacher, 
"Die Organisationen fiir den osterreichisch-deutschen Zusammenschluss," in Friedrich 
F. G. Kleinwaechter and Heinz von Paller, eds., Die Anschlussfrage in ihrer kulturellen, 
politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung (Vienna, 1930), pp. 605-17; Mary Margaret Ball, 
Post-War German Austrian Relations: The Anschluss Movement, 1918-1936 (Stanford, CaL, 
!937); Stanley Suval, The Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era: A Study of Nationalism in 
Germany and Austria (Baltimore, Md., 1974), pp. 30-41. Suval estimates the peak enroll- 
ment of Lobe's organization at about 21,000. 
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the economist Gustav Stolper and Benedikt Kautsky (the son of Karl 
Kautsky), he helped draft the outlines of its program.13 
The Action Society, however, was less important than the Austro- 
German People's League, founded on June 4, 1925, and conceived as a 
"nonpartisan mass organization" which did "not discriminate between 
party affiliation, ideology, or religion, only between friends and ene? 
mies o? Anschluss."14 Neubacher was the architect ofthe People's League 
and became its president, an office he held until 1935. His program, 
modeled on that of the older Berlin group, was designed to comple- 
ment the work ofthe smaller, academically oriented Action Society: by 
organizing one million members he hoped to influence world opinion 
and persuade the League of Nations to sanction a plebiscite on the ques? 
tion of German union.15 
For a decade, Neubacher's name was virtually synonymous with the 
People's League. He was its most active speaker and the chief organizer 
of numerous public demonstrations, which were its primary means of 
influencing opinion. In addition, he edited a monthly (later bimonthly) 
press review called Der Anschluss, which appeared between 1927 and 
1933 and had a peak circulation of about eight thousand. The national 
headquarters ofthe People's League was even located in his Gesiba office 
on the Wahringerstrasse in Vienna. As a respected public figure with 
connections in all the ideological camps, Neubacher was able to fashion 
the People's League into a meeting ground of sorts for Austria's warring 
factions; its original executive included representatives of all parties ex? 
cept the Communists and the Nazis. Among the names that stand out 
today are those of the Vienna city councilman Paul Speiser and Bene? 
dikt Kautsky (Social Democrats), university professors Han Eibl (Chris? 
tian Social) and Wilhelm Bauer (Grossdeutsch), Ernst Molden, an editor 
of the liberal Neue Freie Presse, and Gustav Stolper, whose journal Der 
osterreichische Volkswirt was one of the most influential voices for An- 
13. "Das osterreichische Wirtschaftsproblem: Denkschrift der osterreichisch-deutschen 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft," Der osterreichische Volkswirt (Vienna) 17, no. 42 (July 18, 1925): 
1153-60; Toni Stolper, Ein Leben in Brennpunkten unserer Zeit: Gustav Stolper, 1888-1947 
(Tubingen, 1960), p. 167. 
14. Der Anschluss, Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2. 
15. Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), June 5, 1925 (morning ed.), pp. 4-5; International 
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tri- 
bunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-49) (hereafter IMT), 11: 433-35; Osterreichisch- 
Deutscher Volksbund/Wien, Warumfordern wir den Anschluss? (Vienna, 1926); Paul Lobe 
and Dr. Ing. Neubacher, Die osterreichisch-deutsche Anschlussbewegung (Wurzen, Ger? 
many, 1926). 
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schluss. Neubacher's friend Seyss-Inquart was treasurer of the orga? 
nization.16 
Support for the loosely structured People's League was, however, 
unevenly distributed among the ideological camps. Its strongest pillar, 
at least prior to 1933, was Viennese Social Democracy. Until Hitler 
came to power in Germany, the Socialist Party and its affiliated trade 
unions actively supported Anschluss, and the People's League enjoyed 
their official endorsement. Many leading Socialists spoke and wrote in 
behalf ofthe organization, among them Deutsch, Breitner, Otto Bauer, 
and Karl Renner. Moreover, Vienna's Socialist government contributed 
an annual average often thousand schillings to support its work.17 At 
early demonstrations Socialist influence was so conspicuous that the 
anti-Marxist press more than once erroneously denounced the organi? 
zation as a front for "bolshevism."18 
Less important than the large, disciplined Socialist movement were 
nationalist parties such as the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei and the Landbund. 
Neubacher had close ties with these groups through nationalist societies 
such as the Deutsche Klub, the gymnastics fraternities, and the Deutsche 
Gemeinschaft. By inclination he was most at home in the nationalist 
camp, although he did not share the rigid anti-Marxism, anti-Semitism, 
or Los von Rom fanaticism associated with its extremist wing. Many 
nationalist leaders played prominent roles in the People's League but, in 
the long run, the nationalist parties were too weak and fragmented to 
contribute significantly to the organization, either in numerical or in 
financial terms. 
The Christian Social Party was divided on the issue of union with 
Germany and was, for the People's League, the least important of the 
political groups. Those Christian Socials who supported Anschluss, par? 
ticularly the academics, enthusiastically identified themselves with Neu- 
bacher's efforts, but influential traditionalists within the party feared the 
consequences of merger with the predominantly Protestant and heavily 
socialist German Republic. This faction broadcast its views in the Reichs- 
16. Osterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund in Wien, Was will der Osterreichisch-Deutscher 
Volksbund? (Vienna, 1926). 
17. N. von Preradovich, Die Wilhelmstrasse und Anschluss Osterreichs 1918-1933 (Bern, 
1971), P- 183. 
18. The Christian Social Reichspost, for example, reported the presence of uniformed 
Schutzbund members at ceremonies honoring a visit by Paul Lobe to Vienna in 1925, and 
wondered if, by "Anschluss," the People's League meant union with Germany or Soviet 
Russia. ZAS, vol. 1: Reichspost (Vienna), Aug. 30 and 31, 1925. 
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post, which was one of Neubacher's most severe critics. The leaders of 
the party?Seipel and later Dollfuss?were ambivalent about Anschluss 
and reserved toward the People's League; Seipel, in a now well known 
letter of 1928, privately confided that while he supported Anschluss in 
principle, he opposed "premature agitation."19 Thus, Neubacher was 
unable to win the official endorsement of Christian Socialism; and, 
since the clericals were the dominant party in interwar Austria, his efforts 
to obtain the financial backing of the government went unrewarded. 
This weakness was partially offset by secret contributions from Ger? 
many. Between 1925 and 1932 both the People's League and the Action 
Society received, usually via Lobe, substantial assistance from the Ger? 
man ministries of interior and foreign affairs. The Reich ministry of in? 
terior, for example, allocated some fifteen thousand marks to the Peo? 
ple's League for "Deutschtumspflege" in 1930. These funds were drasti- 
cally curtailed in 1931-32, however, when the world depression struck 
central Europe.20 
The tactical philosophy ofthe People's League was borrowed directly 
from Lobe and based on the premise that the League of Nations Council 
could be persuaded to rectify the injustices of the peace settlement. 
When queried in 1929 regarding the use of force as a possible means of 
resolving the problem of union, Neubacher affirmed his opposition to 
direct action, arguing that violence would only tarnish Austria's image 
abroad; the best solution, he maintained, was a resolute dedication to 
Anschluss diplomacy through international channels.21 Throughout the 
1930s he continued to oppose the use of force as self-defeating. Yet Neu? 
bacher embodied within himself much ofthe ambivalence characteris? 
tic of interwar Austria, and his pronouncements on Anschluss reveal a 
fundamental contradiction in his approach to the problem. On the one 
hand, he appealed to reason, depicting German union as part of an irre- 
sistible global trend toward larger, more efficient geopolitical units. On 
19- Paul R. Sweet, "Seipel's Views on Anschluss in 1928: An Unpublished Exchange of 
Letters," Journal of Modern History 19, no. 4 (Dec. 1947): 320-23. See also Suval, The 
Anschluss Question, pp. 37, 44-45; and Klemens von Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel: Christian 
Statesman in a Time of Crisis (Princeton, N.J., 1972), pp. 112-17, 301-6. To my knowl? 
edge there is no adequate study of Dollfuss's relationship to the Anschluss movement. 
See Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, pp. 32-37. 
20. Preradovich, Die Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 180-89; U.S. National Archives (hereafter 
NA), unsigned report to Wirth, Nov. 20, 1930, Microcopy T-120 (German Foreign 
Office), roll 2492, frames E266802-3 (hereafter T-120/2492/E266802-3); ibid., Lerchen? 
feld to Dr. Emminger, Dec. 2, 1930, T-120/2492/E266842-43. 
21. Der Anschluss, Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2. 
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occasion, he even argued that Anschluss could serve as a model for other 
states to follow toward the goal of European unity. As a propagandist, 
however, his real effectiveness lay in the emotional appeal of his speeches 
and editorials, which were replete with denunciations of French and 
Czech diplomacy and stressed that Anschluss was the necessary product 
ofa unique history which bound Austria and Germany in a "commu? 
nity of destiny."22 Thus, despite his essentially moderate approach to 
the Anschluss question, it cannot be said that Neubacher's rhetoric always 
nourished a spirit of patience and conciliation among his followers. 
Between 1925 and 1933 the People's League staged numerous demon- 
strations, the largest and most successful of which occurred in conjunc- 
tion with the Schubert Centennial, a festival held in Vienna in July 1928 
to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the composer's death. 
The Schubert festival was one ofthe most important demonstrations for 
German unity in the 1920s, attracting singers, musicians, and travelers 
from throughout Europe, and from abroad. Capitalizing on the enthu? 
siasm aroused by the festival, the People's League organized demonstra? 
tions not only in Vienna, but in Styria and the Burgenland, and founded 
chapters in Graz and Eisenstadt.23 
The Schubert Centennial inaugurated a period of rapid growth for 
the People's League, and by April 1929 it had achieved its goal of one mil? 
lion members. This included the Viennese parent chapter and branches 
in Linz, Graz, Eisenstadt, Salzburg, and Klagenfurt, important because 
they reflected support for Anschluss outside of "red" Vienna. The organ? 
ization attained its peak strength in 1930, when it claimed to speak for 
1.8 million Austrians and to represent two-thirds of the electorate.24 
These figures, undoubtedly inflated due to Neubacher's practice of en- 
rolling entire organizations?trade unions, social clubs, professional so? 
cieties, etc.?are nonetheless impressive for a country of less than seven 
million inhabitants.25 
Writing in 1930, Neubacher optimistically interpreted the growth of 
his organization as a sign of "successful settlement of the [Anschluss] 
issue within greater Germany" and "hard-won recognition abroad of 
the urgency of European economic integration, of which Austro-Ger- 
22. Ibid., Aug. 15, 1928, p. 2; Neue Freie Presse, July 20, 1928 (morning ed.), p. 6. 
23. Der Anschluss, Nov. 12, 1928, p. 1; Dec. 15, 1928, p. 1; Jan. 26, 1929, p. 1. 
24. Der Anschluss, Apr. 27, 1929, p. 1; Nov. 29, 1930, p. 1. 
25. Preradovich, Der nationale Gedanke, p. 21; cf. Suval, The Anschluss Question, pp. 
43-44- 
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man union must gradually emerge as the natural starting point."26 This 
observation, while not inaccurate regarding the situation in Austria and 
Germany, seriously exaggerated and misinterpreted the impact of An? 
schluss propaganda abroad. For, although a few foreign scholars knew 
of the People's League and understood its motives, its activities were 
followed neither closely nor sympathetically in the foreign press. This 
is reflected in the large file of newspaper clippings assembled by the 
organization, which consists mainly of items from the Austrian and 
German press. Although clippings from French and east European news? 
papers are numerous, they are generally hostile. The Italian press is 
sparsely represented, and the paucity of clippings from English and 
American newspapers testifies to the meager and partially negative im? 
pact of Anschluss propaganda on Anglo-American opinion.27 The real 
importance of the People's League, it would appear, lies less in the 
achievement of its primary goal?the revision of foreign opinion?than 
in the fact that it helped prepare Austria for an overly optimistic recep- 
tion ofthe customs union proposals of 1931. 
The creation of an Austro-German customs union, one of Neubacher's 
key demands, was widely discussed in the 1920s as an alternative to 
French proposals for a "Danubian federation" of Habsburg succession 
states, and in 1930 Vienna and Berlin secretly began negotiations on the 
question. At about the same time, Neubacher noticeably intensified his 
support for an economic union. Disregarding the possible legal restric? 
tions?such as the Geneva Protocols of 1922, which required Austria to 
avoid economic agreements which might compromise its independence 
?Neubacher maintained that "there are no international legal obstacles 
to the customs union."28 He greeted the plan, announced on March 21, 
1931, as the "first practical result" ofthe work ofthe People's League, 
and predicted with "complete certainty" that it would succeed.29 When 
the governments of France and Czechoslovakia attacked the project as a 
threat to European security, Neubacher responded by stressing that it 
provided not only for Austro-German membership, but also encouraged 
the participation of other states, especially the agrarian nations of east? 
ern Europe; by easing the economic plight of these countries, he argued, 
it would actually contribute to peace. During the summer the People's 
26. Neubacher, "Die Organisationen," p. 617. 
27. See, for example, the New York Times, July 25, 1928, p. 4. 
28. Der Anschluss, July 22, 1930, p. 1; Sept. 30, 1930, p. 1. 
29. Der Anschluss, Mar. 28, 1931, p. 1; Nov. 29, 1930, p. 1. 
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League intensified its propaganda, sponsoring lectures and rallies in 
every part of Austria. 
On May 11, two months after the customs union debate began, the 
Austrian Creditanstalt collapsed and central Europe was plunged into the 
world depression. Neubacher, wTho was later appointed to a three-man 
commission to study the bank's failure, was closely attuned to the finan? 
cial problems ofthe state, which seemed to confirm what he had always 
maintained?that independent Austria was economically viable. For 
Neubacher, Anschluss had always been a question of survival; the failure 
ofthe Creditanstalt, coming precisely at the time ofthe customs union 
controversy, added a new element of urgency to his thinking and trans- 
formed the unionist cause into a real life-and-death struggle. 
The rejection of the customs union project by the Hague Court in 
September was a crucial turning point in the history ofthe Austrian An? 
schluss movement. The negative ruling had a sobering effect on all sup? 
porters of Anschluss, and especially on Neubacher, who had assured his 
readers throughout the summer that the verdict would be favorable. 
Moreover, before the impact of the court's decision could dissipate, 
Neubacher's career suffered an unexpected reverse which contributed 
to his decision to reevaluate the entire question of Anschluss strategy: in 
February 1932 Count Clauzel, the French ambassador, intervened with 
the Austrian government and blocked Neubacher's attempt to become 
a member ofthe reformed executive ofthe Creditanstalt.30 
In March, Neubacher published a pamphlet which revealed the ex? 
tent of his personal bitterness and reflected a shift in his thinking about 
Anschluss. Entitled Der Kampf um Mitteleuropa,31 the tract was an exer- 
cise in geopolitics which purported to offer statistical proof ofthe "nat? 
ural relationship" between Germany, Austria, and the other Habsburg 
succession states. Its argument, however, is less arresting than its tone, 
which is impatient and aggressively nationalistic. Previously Neubacher 
had reserved his invectives for France and Czechoslovakia; now he de- 
nounced the League of Nations and the system of international law as 
well, condemning them as mere tools of French diplomacy. In light of 
the failure ofthe customs union project he concluded that the "League 
of Nations" was a senseless contradiction in terms and predicted that it 
would soon fossilize and die. 
Anger and frustration were further compounded by the desperate ef- 
30. NA, Rieth to Ritter, Feb. 22, 1932, T-120/5195/K467397-400. 
31. Vienna, 1932. 
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forts of the Austrian government to stabilize the country's economy. 
Dollfuss, who became chancellor in May 1932, immediately secured an 
international loan of 300 million schillings, committing Austria in turn 
to the Protocol of Lausanne. Neubacher interpreted this agreement, 
which prohibited experiments in Austro-German union until 1952, as 
an instrument of international blackmail. By this time he was convinced 
that the problem of Austro-German union could not be solved through 
international agreement.32 "Foreign credit and commissions of the 
League of Nations cannot save us," he had already written in the previ? 
ous September. "The road to freedom will only be won through the 
most earnest efforts of national self-help."33 
This appeal to "self-help" was the first public indication that Neu? 
bacher was shifting from the center to the right wing of the Anschluss 
movement; two months later, in November, this became clear when he 
praised rumored efforts ofthe Austrian National Socialist Party and the 
Styrian Heimatschutz, an offshoot of the right-wing Heimwehr move? 
ment distinguished by its support for German union, to draft a common 
program for Anschluss.34 Such statements also presaged the decline of 
the People's League as an organ of mass opinion. Its coffers depleted by 
the recent propaganda campaign, the organization was on the brink of 
financial collapse. Its doctrines were bankrupt as well, for the philosophy 
of nonpartisan cooperation and international conciliation had led to a 
dead end. Although it survived in name until 1938, the People's League 
was killed by the Hague ruling of 1931.35 
Neubacher's initial foray into partisan politics was as a member ofthe 
Styrian Heimatschutz. As a member of several nationalist fraternities, he 
32. ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938. 
33. Der Anschluss, Sept. 21, 1931, p. 1; July 23, 1932, p. 1. 
34. Der Anschluss, Nov. 12, 1931, p. 1. 
35. In October 1933, the Social Democratic Party officially struck Anschluss from its 
program and withdrew its representatives from the executive of the People's League. 
During the next two years Neubacher's organization was watched by the police and 
meetings were sometimes cancelled. Following his arrest in June 1935 (see below) Neu? 
bacher resigned as president ofthe People's League. It remained dormant until June 1937, 
when Seyss-Inquart revived it as a forum for academic opponents of the Schuschnigg 
regime such as Srbik, Nadler, Menghin, and Eibl. The last meeting was held in Vienna on 
May 11, 1938. ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938; Nuernberg, Mili? 
tary Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Con? 
trol Council Law No. 10, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C, 1949-53) (hereafter NMT), 12: 
694, memorandum of Captain Leopold, Aug. 7, 1937, doc. 3282-NG; ZAS, vol. 118: 
Freie Stimmen (Klagenfurt), June 26 and 29, 1937; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, p. 158; 
Frankfurter Zeitung, May 4, 1938 (Reich ed.), p. 2. 
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was well acquainted with most of the Heimwehr leaders, but he had 
hitherto rejected their militant anti-Marxism and emphasis on direct 
action.36 In late 1932, however, both he and Seyss-Inquart joined the 
Styrian group.37 The Heimatschutz was only one branch of the frag- 
mented Heimwehr and offered scant promise of ever becoming a base for 
the mass movement Neubacher had sought to build since 1925. Never? 
theless, it was through the Heimatschutz that he forged his first links with 
the National Socialist Party. Because Anschluss was a basic part of the 
Nazi program, Neubacher had followed the activities of the NSDAP 
for some time;38 there is no indication, however, that he regarded Na? 
tional Socialism seriously before 1931. The Austrian Nazi Party, with 
only a few thousand members in the late 1920s, was not even repre? 
sented on the executive ofthe People's League. But the People's League 
was ineffectual during the customs union and Creditanstalt crises, while 
Hitler's party grew rapidly in Germany and made startling gains in the 
Austrian provincial elections of April 1932. Considering political devel? 
opments in Germany, it seemed reasonable to expect that the next na? 
tional elections would make the Nazi Party a force in the Austrian par? 
liament. For Neubacher, as for Seyss-Inquart, the NSDAP now became 
the logical vehicle for Anschluss. In April 1933, following the Nazi "sei- 
zure of power" in Germany, leaders ofthe Styrian Heimatschutz and the 
Austrian NSDAP concluded an alliance which recognized Adolf Hitler 
as ''Fiihrer ofthe German nation." Shortly thereafter an article appeared 
in Der Panther, the organ ofthe Styrian Heimatschutz, describing Neu? 
bacher as a man "who enjoys the trust of all greater German circles in 
Austria and the Reich." Henceforth Neubacher was intimately involved 
in the activities of the Austrian Nazi movement.39 
36. Der Anschluss, Aug. 15, 1927, p. 1; Sept. 21, 1929, p. 2; Oct. 31, 1929, p. 1. 
37. In light of Neubacher's remarks of May 11, 1938, in which he emphasized the 
importance ofthe Lausanne Protocol (July 1932) in reshaping his attitudes, it seems likely 
that he joined the Heimatschutz in the summer or autumn of 1932. Seyss-Inquart testifled 
at Nuremberg that he (Seyss) joined the organization in the autumn. ASW, Neubacher- 
Blaschke, no. 11/3, May 11, 1938; IMT, 16: 81. 
38. U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression, 10 vols. (Washington, D.C, 1946-48) (hereafter NCA), 2: 958, Seyss- 
Inquart to Himmler, Aug. 19, 1939, doc. 3271-PS. 
39. ZAS, vol. 118: DerPanther (Graz), Apr. 29,1933; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, pp. 
59-60. Neubacher did not officially receive a party number until May 1938. On relations 
between the Styrian Heimatschutz and the NSDAP see Bruce Frederick Pauley, Hahnen- 
schwanz und Hakenkreuz: Steirischer Heimatschutz und osterreichischer Nationalsozialismus 
1918-1934 (Vienna, 1972). 
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As president of the People's League, Neubacher, conscious of the 
need to appeal to the widest possible audience, had never precisely de- 
fined the constitutional form which Anschluss should assume. As a par- 
ticipant in the Nazi movement, however, it became clear that his idea of 
Austrian self-determination was based on the idea of "home rule." Im? 
mediately he identified himself with the opponents of Theo Habicht, 
the German citizen whom Hitler had named "Landesinspekteur" for 
Austria in 1931. The leader of this opposition faction was Anton Rein- 
thaller, who broke with Habicht in the spring of 1933 over the issue of 
terrorism. Reinthaller favored a negotiated settlement of the Anschluss 
question and, according to one of his followers, stood for a synthesis of 
Austrian "state consciousness" and the "greater national idea," hoping 
to transform the NSDAP into a national front composed of the Pan- 
German groups, the Heimwehr, and the nationalist wing ofthe Christian 
Social movement.40 Under his leadership the so-called "national oppo? 
sition" to Dollfuss developed. 
It is a mark ofthe fluidity of Austrian politics that Neubacher's iden? 
tification with Reinthaller's group coincided with an attempt by Doll? 
fuss to draw him into the government. Neubacher's contacts with the 
Socialists, the Heimatschutz, and the moderate wing ofthe NSDAP made 
him a potentially valuable ally for the government, especially in Vienna, 
where he was associated with the popular housing program. In April 
1933 Dollfuss offered Neubacher the position of undersecretary of state 
for labor. The chancellor's policies, however?negotiation of the Lau- 
sanne Protocol, and subsequently his suspension of parliament in March 
1933?had opened a breach between the two men. Neubacher refused 
the post and at the same time, publicly declared himself a member of 
the national opposition.41 
This incident was one of the first in a series of well-documented 
attempts by Dollfuss to reach an understanding with representatives of 
National Socialism and the Anschluss movement. For over a year he 
walked a diplomatic tightrope, fearing the "protection" of Mussolini 
nearly as much as the Austrian Nazis and domination by Berlin. Al? 
though attempts to deal with Habicht were fruitless and led to the ban- 
ning of the Nazi Party in June, Dollfuss kept the back door open to 
40. Franz Langoth, Kampf um Osterreich: Erinnerungen eines Politikers (Wels, Austria, 
1951), pp. 209, 383-84. 
41. ZAS, vol. 118: (title missing), Apr. 23, 1933; Caroline Neubacher to the author, 
Vienna, Nov. 6,1971. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:36:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
362 Neubacher and the Austrian Anschluss Movement 
Reinthaller's national opposition, hoping to find someone other than 
Habicht with whom to negotiate. In the late spring of 1934, shortly 
before he was murdered, Dollfuss entertained a proposal, sponsored by 
Neubacher, to circumvent Habicht and deal with the higher leadership 
ofthe NSDAP in Berlin.42 
Neubacher's strategy?which he discussed with Dollfuss in late May 
or early June43?was designed to capitalize on tensions within the Aus? 
trian Nazi movement and to take advantage of recent international de? 
velopments. Like almost every aspect of Austrian life, the NSDAP suf? 
fered from acute factionalism; since mid-1933 the movement had been 
divided by a struggle between Habicht (supported by a small SS organi? 
zation) and the SA, led in Austria by Hermann Reschny. As early as 
November 1933, Ernst Rohm, chief ofthe SA, began to take a personal 
interest in the rivalry, which intensified following the civil war in Feb? 
ruary 1934.44 Through contacts at the German embassy, Neubacher 
knew that Habicht's credit in Berlin had begun to decline after February 
and that, in deference to Mussolini, Hitler was adopting a more flexible 
Austrian policy, based on a gradual settlement ofthe Anschluss question. 
At the same time, prospects for an agreement with Dollfuss seemed 
promising, since the Austrian chancellor was himself involved in a des- 
perate struggle with the Heimwehr members of his cabinet?Prince Star- 
hemberg and Emil Fey?to win the support of nationalist forces. 
In their meeting Dollfuss and Neubacher discussed the possibility 
of the latter's becoming leader of the NSDAP in Austria (presumably 
through Rohm's influence), and Dollfuss promised the national opposi? 
tion four cabinet posts if Neubacher replaced Habicht. UnawTare that 
Rohm's stock was declining even more rapidly than Habicht's, Neu? 
bacher carried his plan to the very top ofthe Nazi hierarchy, securing an 
audience with the Fiihrer himself. When he attempted to discuss his 
42. Dieter Ross, Hitler und Dollfuss: Die deutsche Osterreich-Politik 1933-1934 (Ham? 
burg, 1966); Jurgen Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, 1931-1938 (London, 1963), 
pp. 45-87. 
43. U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. 13 vols. 
(Washington, D.C, 1957-64), series C (1933-36) (hereafter DGFP), 3: 47, Habicht to 
Hiiffer, June 18,1934, doc. 17. This report is the only record ofthe Neubacher plan. Ross 
believes that it was written by Otto Wachter (an agent of Habicht) shortly before Hit? 
ler's meeting with Mussolini in Venice on June 14-15, and that it was instrumental in 
Habicht's final decision to launch a putsch in July. Ross, Hitler and Dollfuss, p. 229. 
44. Helmuth Auerbach, "Eine nationalsozialistische Stimme zum Wiener Putsch vom 
25. July 1934," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte 12 (Jan. 1964): 201-18; Ross, Hitler und 
Dollfuss, pp. 113-17, 184, 214. 
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project, however, Hitler avoided the issue and asked him not to talk 
about Austria at all. Habicht, still confident of Hitler's support, warned 
Neubacher not to accept an invitation to visit Rohm while he was in 
Germany.45 
The purge of Rohm on June 20 brought the project to a sudden halt, 
and Neubacher was fortunate that his career in Nazi politics was not 
ended by his association with the SA leader. His future would almost 
certainly have been darker had it not been for the fact that, less than a 
month after the liquidation of Rohm, Theo Habicht was himself recalled 
by an enraged Hitler for having planned the putsch of July 25 in which 
Dollfuss was killed. Neubacher was arrested by the Austrian police and 
held briefly on suspicion of complicity in the putsch, but he was soon 
released for lack of evidence. Although his precise relationship to the 
events of July 25 remains unclear,46 a persuasive reason for believing 
that he was not actually involved is the fact that the attempted coup was 
carried out by members of the Austrian SS Standarte 89. It is unlikely 
that Neubacher's close ties with the SA?which did not participate in 
the putsch?and his long hostility to Habicht would have made him 
welcome among the conspirators, even had he wanted to become in? 
volved. 
The putsch altered the situation in Austria. Hitler, anxious to disasso- 
ciate himself from the affair, made it clear that?for the present?there 
was to be no direct contact between the Reich and the Nazi movement 
in Austria.47 This gave the national opposition leaders what appeared to 
be a new chance to shape the movement without interference from the 
north, albeit in even less favorable circumstances than had existed before 
July 25. 
45. DGFP, 3: 47, Habicht to Hiiffer, June 18,1934, doc. 17; cf. Gehl, Austria, Germany 
and the Anschlsss, p. 94; Ross, Hitler und Dollfuss, p. 299. 
46. Otto Wachter and Rudolf Weydenhammer, two ofthe leading conspirators, later 
wrote accounts ofthe putsch. Neither mentioned Neubacher in connection with the plot, 
although Weydenhammer stated that he talked briefly with Neubacher in the vicinity of 
the Ballhausplatz on the afternoon of July 25, while members ofthe SS Standarte 89 were 
occupying the chancellery. Rudolf Weydenhammer, "Bericht iiber die Erhebung der 
Nationalsozialisten am 25. Juli 1934 in Wien," NSDAP Hauptarchiv, The Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, reel 33, folder 634, frames 2i2ff. (written 
shortly after the Anschluss in 1938); Auerbach, "Eine nationalsozialistische Stimme," pp. 
204-5; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, pp. 74-75. 
47. According to Hitler's deputy, Hess, "The Austrian NSDAP must decide where and 
in what form they will build a new party by themselves.17 DGFP, 3: 352-53, Hess to 
Frauenfeld, Aug. 21, 1934, doc. 173. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:36:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
364 Neubacher and the Austrian Anschluss Movement 
Although Schuschnigg, the new chancellor, was less flexible than the 
agile Dollfuss, certain of his actions encouraged the Reinthaller group 
to renew contacts with the government. Chief among these was Schusch- 
nigg's toleration of the activities of the "Langoth Circle," a group 
formed by Franz Langoth after the July putsch to assist the families of 
imprisoned and exiled Nazis. It was also well known that, like Dollfuss, 
Schuschnigg distrusted Mussolini and the influence he exercised through 
the Heimwehr members of the government. Under these circumstances 
Reinthaller launched a fresh effort to reach an accommodation with the 
government. Meanwhile, he assigned Neubacher the task of reorganiz- 
ing the illegal Nazi party.48 
The July putsch had thrown the party into chaos, and Neubacher 
sought to use the opportunity to bring it under the control ofthe Rein? 
thaller faction. His major difficulty, aside from keeping his activities 
hidden from the authorities, was winning the acceptance ofthe militant 
older members of the party who opposed Reinthaller for advocating 
compromise with the government. The subsequent failure ofthe "Rein? 
thaller Action," which culminated in an unsuccessful October meeting 
between Schuschnigg, Starhemberg, and a delegation of the national 
opposition (including Neubacher),49 forced Reinthaller to renounce his 
claim to party leadership in favor of Neubacher, who assumed the task 
of keeping the moderate position alive. A struggle for leadership ofthe 
party ensued, the national opposition grouping itself around Neubacher, 
the older members rallying behind Joseph Leopold, a senior party mem? 
ber from Lower Austria. Leopold consistently opposed the evolutionary 
strategy favored by Reinthaller, Neubacher, and their successor, Seyss- 
Inquart; reluctant to adapt his own ideas to the shifting policies of Ber? 
lin, he ultimately became a black sheep in the party and was ordered out 
of Austria by Hitler shortly before the Anschluss in 1938. He was a for- 
midable opponent, nonetheless, and proved stronger than Neubacher, 
who was handicapped by his lack of seniority, his past association with 
48. NA, report by Prinz zu Erbach, "Bisherige Ergebnislosigkeit der Verstandigungs- 
aktion Reinthaller," Oct. 18, 1934, T-77 (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) 
/900/5653797-805; NCA, 2: 962-63, Seyss-Inquart, "The Austrian Question, 1934- 
1938," Sept. 9, 1945, doc. 3254-PS; DGFP, 3: 334, memorandum by Huffer, Aug. 20, 
1934, doc. 166. 
49. NA, report by Prinz zu Erbach, Oct. 18, 1934, T-77/900/5653797-805; Ernst 
Rudiger Starhemberg, Memoiren (Vienna, 1971), pp. 209-14. Secondary accounts ofthe 
failure ofthe Reinthaller action are plentiful. See Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, 
p. 105. 
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Austrian Marxism, and his former connections with the SA leadership 
and the Styrian Heimatschutz.50 The struggle, which lasted well into the 
spring of 1935, soon attracted a wider audience. As early as January 1935, 
the press reported rumors that Neubacher was the new Nazi leader, and 
surmised that the information had been leaked by his enemies as a way 
of eliminating him. In May a Vienna newspaper named Leopold as 
chief ofthe illegal Nazis and Neubacher as the "grey eminence" ofthe 
movement.51 On June 21 the police searched Neubacher's residence and 
office, uncovering documents which enabled them to arrest Neubacher, 
Leopold, and a number of others. Both men were tried for illegal politi? 
cal activity and sentenced to periods of imprisonment.52 
This arrest ended Neubacher's political activity in Austria for a period 
of three years. Although he was released after the Austro-German agree? 
ment of July 11, 1936 (which included an amnesty for political pris? 
oners), Neubacher renounced his claim to party leadership and took a 
position with I. G. Farben in Berlin. In Austria the struggle between the 
moderate and radical wings ofthe Anschluss movement was renewed in 
the form ofa rivalry between Seyss-Inquart and Leopold (also released 
by the 1936 amnesty), but Neubacher was not directly involved. Be? 
tween January 1937 and March 1938 he worked for Farben as a special- 
ist in the economic affairs of Austria and southeastern Europe and trav- 
eled widely in the Balkans, where he gained experience which quali- 
fied him for diplomatic posts in the area during World War II. He 
played no role in the events immediately leading to Anschluss in 193 8.53 
The final chapter in Neubacher's involvement in the Anschluss move? 
ment began on March 13, 1938, when he was appointed mayor of Vi? 
enna under Austria's new chancellor, Seyss-Inquart. The appointment 
was tactical; Neubacher's past association with Social Democracy and 
its popular housing program made him one of the few figures in Nazi 
circles qualified to exploit working-class hostility toward the Schusch- 
50. IMT, 34: 1-11, speech by Rainer, Mar. 11, 1942, doc. 4005-PS; IMT, 26: 349-51, 
report by Rainer, July 6, 1939, doc. 812-PS. The struggle was complicated by a rivalry 
between "old fighters" ofthe NSDAP and men who had entered the movement via the 
Heimatschutz, who were never completely accepted. 
51. ZAS, vol. 118: Telegraf am Mittag (Vienna), Jan. 15, 1935, and Der Osterreicher 
(Vienna), May 3, 1935. 
52. IMT, 34: 1-11, speech by Rainer, Mar. 11, 1942, doc. 4405-PS; IMT, 26: 349-51, 
report by Rainer, July 6, 1939, doc. 812-PS; Langoth, Kampf um Osterreich, p. 202. 
53. NMT, 7:1397-98, extracts from the minutes of Farben's Commercial Committee, 
Mar. 23,1938, doc. 9289-NI; private interview with Caroline Neubacher, Vienna, Aug. 
20, 1972; Rosar, Deutsche Gemeinschaft, p. 264. 
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nigg regime and to prepare the city for the plebiscite of April 10 on the 
question of union. To this end he revived the idea that the NSDAP was 
a social revolutionary party, pledging the Vienna workers a "socialism 
ofthe deed" and promising an end to unemployment by the end ofthe 
year.54 
Immediately, Neubacher began a program to reinstate Socialist acti- 
vists dismissed from municipal jobs by the Schuschnigg government 
and, in numerous speeches, tried to win the support of former Schutz- 
bund members, basing his appeal on the idea that both Socialists and 
Nazis had waged a revolutionary struggle against the clerical dictator? 
ship. Depicting National Socialism as an alternative to capitalism, he 
emphasized rationalization and planning as essential aspects of Nazi eco? 
nomic policy. 
55 On March 31 he unveiled plans for a housing program 
modeled on that ofthe Social Democrats, and public housing became a 
major theme of his speeches for several months. During the summer he 
also outlined ambitious proposals for public works in Vienna to create 
employment and prepare Vienna for a new role as the Third Reich's 
gateway to southeastern Europe.56 
Neubacher's sincerity in these matters is indisputable since, next to 
Anschluss, his major concern had always been municipal reform. Ini- 
tially, he seems to have been fairly successful in rallying support for the 
NSDAP; in April the Times correspondent reported that "Of all the 
local Nazis, Dr. Neubacher, the new Burgomaster of Vienna, has prob? 
ably done the most to conciliate those, especially in the working class, 
who do not have Nazi convictions."57 Since municipal reform was 
never a genuine priority of the higher officials of the Reich, however, 
Neubacher's housing and public-works programs, which would have 
taken decades to complete, hardly got off the ground. Over a year after 
54- ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 11/1, Apr. 25, 1938. An illustrated booklet, Die 
nationalsozialistische Revolution in Wien: Bildbericht iiber die Wiener Ereignisse vom 11 Marz 
bis 10 April 1938 (Vienna, 1938), conveys the spirit ofthe propaganda campaign; Neu? 
bacher wrote the introduction. 
55. Wiener Zeitung, Apr. 1, 1938, p. 4, and Apr. 8, 1938, p. 7; ASW, Neubacher- 
Blaschke, no. 18/7, Oct. 10, 1938. 
56. Wiener Zeitung, Apr. 1, 1938, p. 10; Neue Freie Presse, Aug. 1, 1938 (Monday ed.), 
p. 3; Frankfurter Zeitung, Dec. 9, 1938 (Reich ed.), Southeast Europe supplement, p. 9; 
ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 12/6, July 16, 1938. Friedrich Heer, Der Glaube des 
Adolf Hitler: Anatomie einer politischen Religiositdt (Munich, 1968), p. 416, describes Neu? 
bacher's interest in southeastern Europe as representative ofa "k.-k.-6sterreichisch-ost- 
markischer Nationalsozialismus." 
57. The Times (London), Apr. 2, 1938, p. 11. 
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the Anschluss, the housing situation in Vienna was still described as criti? 
cal, and Neubacher was forced to qualify his earlier promises. 
58 
Following the plebiscite of April 10, Neubacher's prominence in Aus? 
tria's "new order," like that of many other former leaders of the na? 
tional opposition, rapidly diminished. Inevitably he became involved in 
the power struggle between his longtime friend Seyss-Inquart and Jo? 
seph Biirckel, the Rhinelander who came to Vienna to act as "coordina- 
tor" of Gleichschaltung with the Reich. Biirckel, who surrounded him? 
self with associates from the Rhineland, quickly replaced Seyss as the 
most important man in Austria. In June 1938 rumors circulated that 
Seyss and Neubacher had submitted grievances to Hitler at Berchtes- 
gaden, only to be rudely rebuffed.59 Seyss was quickly pushed to the 
periphery of Austrian affairs, and eventually excluded entirely. Neu? 
bacher suffered a similar fate: in late 1938 Biirckel's staff began to pre? 
pare a case against the new mayor. The question of Neubacher's "bol? 
shevik" sympathies was revived, and he was also accused of association 
with the "most vile" Jewish circles. On the basis of these charges Biirckel 
reorganized the city government in February 1939, naming himself 
"Gauleiter" and "Reichstatthalter" of Vienna; Neubacher remained in 
the municipal government, but only as Biirckel's "general representa? 
tive."60 As the year wore on and Neubacher's authority continued to 
diminish, it became clear that he had no future in Vienna; when the 
opportunity presented itself he accepted a "temporary" position as eco? 
nomic advisor to the German embassy in Rumania, where he helped 
negotiate the Oil-Arms Agreement of May 1940. He was still formally 
a member of the Viennese government and, for a time, tried to main? 
tain contact with Vienna from his post in Bucharest. He soon realized 
the futility of his efforts, however, especially after a new personality ar- 
58. Frankfurter Zeitung, Apr. 9,1939 (Reich ed.), p. 5; ASW, Neubacher-Blaschke, no. 
97> July 8, 1939. More important than new construction in dealing with the problem of 
working-class housing was the requisitioning of Jewish apartments, an aspect of the offi? 
cial anti-Semitism introduced by the NSDAP. Neubacher endorsed requisitioning but 
opposed the violent outbursts of popular anti-Semitism which followed the Anschluss. 
Neue Freie Presse, Mar. 17, 1938 (evening ed.), p. 1; Deutsch, Ein Weiter Weg, p. 158. 
59. Arnold J. Toynbee and V. M. Boulter, eds., Survey of International Affairs: 1938 
(London, 1941), pp. 257-58. 
60. NA, Burckel to Goring, Oct. 15, 1938, T-84 (Miscellaneous German Records) 
/13/10360; NA, Burckel to Goring, Oct. 27,1938, T-84/13/10362-64; NA, Records of 
the Reichkommissar fiir die Wiedervereinigung Osterreichs mit dem deutschen Reich, 
T-84/13/10368-72; IMT, 11: 434; Frankfurter Zeitung, Apr. 22, 1939 (Reich ed.), p. 2, 
and May 5, 1939 (Reich ed.), p. 10. 
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rived on the scene in the Austrian capital, one with even more influence 
than Burckel: the Nazi youth leader, Baldur von Schirach. Schirach, 
who was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna by Hitler in the summer of 1940, 
was given access to the file concerning Neubacher's past and warned by 
Burckel that Neubacher wanted to become "king of Vienna." The 
whole affair dissipated as the war progressed and Neubacher's "tempo? 
rary" appointment with the foreign ministry became permanent.61 
Neubacher's early career, no less than that of his friend Seyss-Inquart, 
mirrors the difficulties which beset interwar Austria. Political life in the 
first republic was a peculiar blend of lofty idealism and petty intrigue. 
In retrospect it is difficult to avoid the conclusion?shared by many 
Austrians at the time?that Austrian politics were absurdly parochial, 
that the issues debated so fiercely were too grand for the forum, that 
the "great social, cultural, and economic questions, the ones that affect 
the world," could never be resolved within the confines of the tiny 
state.62 Underlying the tumult was one inescapable fact: regardless of 
ideological persuasion (or lack thereof) the majority of Austrians simply 
refused to accept the idea that they were no longer the ruling nationality 
ofa great empire, that they were no longer a "historic people." No one 
expressed this feeling more clearly than Ignaz Seipel, twice chancellor of 
the republic, when he called the Austrians a "big-state people" with a 
mission yet to perform in the world.63 In the minds of most Austrians, 
that ill-defined mission would be fiilfilled within the context of some 
form of union with Germany. 
For many people?particularly in Vienna?Hermann Neubacher, the 
impartial career bureaucrat, became in the late 1920s a symbol of oppo? 
sition to Austria's seemingly untenable situation. His Austro-German 
People's League, more effectively than any other organization, articu- 
lated popular resentment toward an ethically indefensible peace, one 
which forced Austria to "accommodate herself to artificial boundaries 
far below her historical and national level" and transformed her into a 
"stagnant pool . . . separated from the great living current of world 
events."64 From his own point of view, Neubacher acted as a patriot, 
one who avoided the nostalgia of monarchism while working to recap- 
6i. NA, Neubacher to Wiehl, Apr. 17,1940, T-120/1170/471746; ASW, Neubacher- 
Blaschke, no. 119, Mar. 9, 1940. 
62. Der Anschluss, May 16, 1929, p. 1. 
63. Sweet, "Seipel's Views," p. 323. 
64. Der Anschluss, Oct. 31, 1929, p. 2. 
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ture for Austria the greatness she had once enjoyed as the heart ofa cos- 
mopolitan empire. The decisions and agreements of 1931-32 destroyed 
the work he had begun, and the triumphs of National Socialism in Ger? 
many and Austria confronted him with a critical choice. Like many of 
those who became leaders ofthe "national opposition," Neubacher was 
by temperament a moderate who opposed the use of force and favored 
"legal" (i.e., bureaucratic) solutions to problems; but his uncompromis- 
ing will for Anschluss made him a potential ally of radicalism and, in the 
end, he placed himself at the disposal of ultranationalism.65 
Neubacher had always supported Anschluss in the name of self-deter? 
mination, and he continued to do so after 1933 in the expectation that 
Austrian autonomy would be honored within the framework of the 
Third Reich. These were illusory hopes and, since 1938, they have been 
regularly cited as evidence ofthe naivete of Hitler's moderate support? 
ers in Austria. Such charges are not entirely justified, however, since the 
precise meaning of "Anschluss" was never firmly established prior to 
March 1938, either in Austria or in Berlin. Under the circumstances, the 
idea that Austria might enjoy special status within a greater Germany 
did not necessarily seem in valid; indeed, it appears that only after his 
enthusiastic reception in Linz on March 12 did the Fiihrer himself decide 
against a personal union ofthe two countries in favor of total absorption 
of Austria.66 Once that decision was made, Gleichschaltung became the 
sobering epilogue to the history of the Austrian Anschluss movement. 
Little is gained, however, by dismissing Neubacher and Hitler's other 
moderate supporters as naive dupes, or as "crypto-Nazi" leaders ofa 
"fifth column"; the history of interwar Austria has been too long ob- 
scured by oversimplification and emotionalism. The "Anschluss men" 
were essentially motivated by the desire to see Austrians determine their 
own fate; the irony is that in pursuing this goal so singlemindedly they 
unconsciously contributed to the destruction of their dream. 
65. See the comments of Alexander Bernhard Spitzmuller-Harmersbach, 
" . . . Und 
hat auch Ursach, es zu Liebeniy (Vienna, 1955), pp. 396-97. 
66. Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, pp. 194-95. 
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